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PROSPECTS FOR THEORIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
AUSTIN T. TURK
Dr. Turk is Assistant Professor of Sociology in Indiana University. He received the Ph.D. degree
in 1962 from the University of Wisconsin, where he was a Predoctoral Research Fellow of the
National Institute of Mental Health. Dr. Turk served as Acting Instructor in Sociology in the
University of Wisconsin in 1961-1962. He received the B.A. degree in 1956 from the University of
Georgia and the M.A. degree in 1959 from the University of Kentucky.
Is it possible to develop scientific explanations of "criminal behavior"? What promise exists for
the search for "criminal types"? Is crime a class of behavior? Can theories of "crime" and of "criminal behavior" be integrated? Considering these and related questions, in the following article Dr.
Turk calls for recognition of the distinction between the problems of crime "amelioration," in which
the effort is to control and reform behavior the criminality of which is assumed, and the scientific
problems of criminology, in which the effort should be to explain the labelling of behavior as criminal.-EDITOR.

This paper is addressed to the conceptualization
of criminology as a scientific instead of an "applied" discipline-which implies that the field is
thought of here as the study of crime per se without any necessary concern with controlling or
changing behavior defined as "criminal" at some
time in some jurisdiction. The objectives are (1)
to indicate the evidence against the assumption
that crime is a behavior class, a subcategory of
deviant behavior; (2) to reject the view that it is
mandatory, or even possible, for criminologists to
produce theories of criminal, as distinct from
noncriminal, behavior, i.e., theories explaining
why and how specific individuals "deviated" in a
legal sense and why and how other specific individuals did not so "deviate"; and (3) to suggest
that success both in "scientific" and in "ameliorative" work presupposes that those interested
in crime from either perspective will be more
careful with the distinction between (a) assuming
the criminality of some behavior and seeking to
control or change it, and (b) trying to explain why
the behavior is labelled "criminal" in the first
place. The writer submits that criminology has
not been focused upon the problems of explaining
the criminality, the labelling, but has in fact been
almost exclusively focused upon explaining behavior as such, in spite of Sutherland's statement
of the criminological problem: "to explain the
criminality of behavior, not the behavior as such."'
'SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OP CRImINOLOGY 4 (4th
ed. 1947). Sutherland himself did not fully accept the
implication of his statement by breaking away from a
preoccupation with the behavior of offenders. The
furthest advance in his thought appears to have been
that "it is improper to view criminal behavior as a

Is "CRIME" BEHAVIOR?

The history of criminology is largely that of the
search for criminal types-biological, psychological, or sociological. Students of crime have
been preoccupied with the search for and explanation of distinguishing characteristics of "criminality," almost universally assuming that the
implied task is to develop scientific explanations of
the behavior of persons who deviate from "legal
norms." The quest has not been very successful.
Research has demonstrated the inadequacies of
theories stressing biological determinants and
appears to be doing the same for theories proposing
fundamental, etiologically significant differences
between criminals and non-criminals in regard to
dimensions of personality. The study of the
criminal as a social type and of his behavior as an
analytically distinct system tends to dissolve into
the study of variations in the life styles and
opportunity structures of people located at different points in a given social structure.2 Rather than
developing theories of criminal behavior, the
cumulative impact of efforts to specify and exclosed system, and participation in criminal behavior is
not to be regarded as something that is determined exclusively by association with criminal patterns."
COHEN, LnwzEsmTm & SCHEESSLER, THE SUTHERLAND

PAPERs 36 (1956).
Instead of theories explaining the criminality of
some juvenile and adult behavior, the work of Cohen,
Miller, Cloward and Ohlm, and other students of
subcultural differentiation and opportunity structures
promises explanations of behavior patterns and differences per se, explanations of tremendous potential
value for the purposes of crime prevention and control.
However, the "criminological problem" is scarcely
touched.
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plain differences between "criminal" and "noncriminal" cultural and behavior patterns is to
force serious consideration of the possibility that
there may be no significant 3 differences between
the overwhelming majority of legally identified
criminals and the relevant general population, i.e.,
that population whose concerns and expectations
impinge directly and routinely upon the individuals so identified. If in truth we are dealing
not with individual departures from the norms of
their groups but with subcultures wherein persons
develop in ways more or less likely to get them
into trouble with the Law, then we must inquire
into the "criminality" of certain subcultures. At
this point there are two alternatives: (1) to accept
the laws in effect at a given time and place, and
therefore assume the criminality of some subcultures; or (2) to question the laws, asking why
there is some degree of association between subcultural variations and variations in crime rates.
Historically, the great bulk of criminological
thought and research has developed within the
confines of the first alternative and is not, consequently, directly relevant to the problems of
explaining criminality. It is, of course, very true
that contributions to the theoretical and methodological progress of the behavior sciences have been
by-products of efforts by criminologists who were
actually studying behavior rather than criminality.
Moreover, much useful descriptive and "applied"
knowledge has come from efforts to locate offenders
in social space and to explore connections between
human experiences and criminality as defined in
particular locales. The pragmatic value of research
aimed at learning how to prevent or suppress
certain kinds of behavior is incontestable; if one
accepts the values reflected in particular laws, then
he will seek knowledge that enables him to insure
most effectively the survival and continued
dominance of those values. On the other hand,

from a more detached standpoint, the problem is
to explain why some values are dominant while
others are not. Criminological research has typically been carried out as if the values problem were
no problem at all; the working assumption has
been that crime and not-crime are classes of behavior instead of simply labels associated with the
process by which individuals come to occupy the
ascribed (not necessarily having anything to do
with actual behavior) statuses of criminal and
non-criminal. Efforts to determine the basic differences between crime and not-crime viewed as
behavior and between criminals and non-criminals
viewed as different kinds of people have contributed to eight kinds of evidence tending to
destroy the very premise upon which such efforts
have been based: that basic differences exist.
In each instance the evidence has been summarized as an empirical generalization. Opinions
vary in regard to the relative importance of the
several propositions and to the quality of the
evidence represented by each. Taken in combination, however, the propositions do at least constitute a strong case against the assumption that the
study of crime is synonymous with the study of a
class or classes of behavior.
1. There is apparently no pattern of human
behavior which has not been at least toleratedin some
4
normative structure. The anthropology of law,
historical and comparative analysis of legal documents, 5 research into subcultural differentiation, 6
and studies of the extent of "deviant" forms of
behavior in general populations7 have undermined
the assumption that there are universally applicable distinctions between, right and wrong.' If

'That is, significant from the standpoint of a psychologically and sociologically adequate criterion differentiating criminal from non-criminal attributes
irrespective of the discriminatory enactment, interpretation, and enforcement of statutes. The "irrespective of" recognizes differences between scientific and
legal classification as noted by legal scholars such as
Jerome Hall and Karl Llewellyn. HAL, STms IN
JUriSPRUDENCE AMD CPJMINAL THEORY 146 (1958),
distinguishes between theoretical knowledge concerned
with causes and practical knowledge concerned with

oF DEvmAcE (1963); Miller, Lower Class Culture as a
Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. SocIAL
IssUEs 5 (1958); Cohen & Short, Research in Delinquent
Subcultures, id. at 20; CiowaRn & Oafm, DELIN-
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NAT'L PROBATION 107 (1947); SuT
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(1949); CLINARn, TEE BLACK MARKE
(1952); KINSEY et al., SExuAL BEHAVIOR nq THE HumA MALE (1948), and SEuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
Hu-mm, FEuALE (1953); Nye & Short, Scaling Ddin-

quent Behavior, 22 Ams. Soc. REv. 326 (1957).
8This is not to say that social structures and cultures

may not eventually be rated in terms of their viability,

or that general value-assumptions derived from con-
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there is no behavior pattern which is universally
defined as criminal, then research on the etiology
of "criminal" behavior is inevitably culturespecific and time-bound, since the phenomenon
under study will change from culture to culture
and from time to time within essentially the same
culture.
2. The behavioral elements comprising an illegal
act are not specific to criminal as distinguishedfrom
other human behavior. Activities of the human
organism-such as manipulation of material
objects, display of violence, introduction of
"illicit" substances into the body, indulgence in
"perverted" sexual practices, frequenting of
"off-limits" places, and "fraudulent" or "subversive" manipulation of symbols (e.g., numbers,
words, gestures, facial expressions)-do not automatically sort themselves into the criminal and
the non-criminal. The sorting is a matter of cultural
definition and of the inclination and power to
apply definitions in specific instances.
"[Since] the muscular processes in criminal
behavior are not unique, their study contributes
nothing to the understanding of criminal
behavior. Similarly the needs, values, goals,
etc. in criminal behavior are not unique, and
explanations cannot be made in terms of them." 9
3. There is selective and differential perception of
every element (individuals, testimony, actions,
sources and targets of actions, sequences of events,
location and use of material objects, etc.) of a situation involving a criminal act. Kom and McCorkle
consider the assumption that the facts in each
criminal case can be established as "probably the
most important and the least demonstrable in all
of the law."' 0 The difficulties involved in efforts to
arrive at "the truth" as perceived by even the
most honest of witnesses are compounded by the
necessary reliance upon their recall of their perceptions." Additional and largely unintended
screening of the raw material of human affairs
occurs as the police, prosecutors, defense counsel,
ceptions of prerequisites for viable patterns of living
may not achieve a high degree of consensus. LEVY,
Ti STRucTuRE oF Socrm-Ty 111-97 (1952); Northrop,
Cultural Values, and Bidney, The Concept of Value in
Modern Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 66881, 682-99 (Kroeber ed. 1953).
9 CorEN, LmnDESMITH & SCUESSLER, op. cit. supra

note0 1, at 38.
1 KORN & McCoRKLE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY
88 (1959).
11Davidson, Appraisal of Witnesses, 110 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY 481 (1954); Weinstein, The Law's Attempt To
Obtain Useful Testimony, 13 J. SOCIAL IssuEs 6 (1957).
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judges, psychiatrists, and others attempt to sift

and order the materials.n If even within a culture
there is variation in the perceptions of those
involved in determining the applicability of
sanctions in specific cases, then the same behavior
will sometimes be defined as crime and on other
occasions be defined as not-crime, and different

behavior will sometimes be labelled as identical
behavior.
4. An individual's range of behavior includes
many more acceptable than illegal actions, objectives, and relations.13 The entirely vicious and
treacherous individual who poses a continual and
indiscriminate threat would be intolerable in any
human group. Individuals who cannot or do not
approximate the norms of their regular associates
are eliminated in some manner--confinement,
banishment, extermination. 4 If virtually all
individuals identified as criminals within a jurisdiction are indistinguishable most of the time in
most respects from non-criminals, then the expectation that there is some fundamental difference between these two categories is, to say the
least, questionable.
5. Criminal acts attributed to the same individual
vary in terms both of the actual or imputed behavior
on separate occasions and of the frequencies of
particularacts. Life histories," analyses of arrest
and other police contact records,' and studies of
12FRANK, Cou-Ts ON TR AL: MYTH AND REAI.rY
(1950); Arens & Meadow, Psy-

IN AAERicAN JusTicE

cholinguisticsand the Confession Dilemma, 56 CoLum. L.
REv. 38 (1956); Robinson, Bias, Probability,and Trial
by Jury, 15 Am. Soc. REv. 73 (1950); Strodtbeck,
James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations,
22 id. at 713 (1957); GREEN, JUDICIAL ATITrruDEs IN
SENTENCING (1961); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and
Criminal Cases, 53 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 333 (1962);
Ferracuti, Perez & Wolfgang, A Study of Police Errors
in Crime Classification, id. at 113.
3In the theoretical limiting case where illegality
exceeds legality, madness rather than criminality would
most likely be inferred by fellows, legal authorities, and
behavior scientists.
14E.g., HOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 90-91.
15SHAW, TEE JACK Rouxtr (1930), THE NATURAL
OF A DELINQUENT CAREER (1931), and
B~oTHERs IN Cnr
(1938).
16 Current emphasis upon descriptive types of offenders and upon relatively stable records in terms of
broad categories such as personal versus property offenses reflects the rehabilitative interest in changing
HISTORY

behavior rather than the theoretical interest in learning
how the adjective "criminal" comes to be applied to
the individual and aspects of his behavior in the first
place. Mayhew and Moreau are still very much with us.
(Lindesmith & Dunham, Some Principles of Criminal
Typology, 19 SocLL FoRcEs 307 (1941).) E.g., Gibbons

& Garrity, Definition and Analysis of Certain Criminal

Types, 53 J. Cram. L., C. & P.S. 27 (1962); Schrag, A
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recidivism 7 indicate that variability rather than
specialization is characteristic of known offenders.
The highly specialized psychotic whose timing,
locale, victim, and mode of attack are almost
invariable is an extreme rarity. Similarly, the
code-conscious "professional" who is strictly
limited to a field of criminal activity in which he
exercises his skills with great discrimination is
probably more a creation of journalism, romanticism, and commercialism than an empirically
demonstrable social type. If the records of most
individuals who have at times been assigned the
status of criminal show that the acts attributed to
them varied, then one may doubt that there is a
detectable pattern in the officially and punitively
recognized behavior of most sometime criminals.
If there is no "career line" in the records of most
of these persons, then there is little reason to
expect theories of behavior to account for records
of crime. Such records may or may not be valid
indicators of the actual behavior patterns of
particular individuals; to the extent that there is
correspondence, it is in spite of rather than because
of the processes by which crime records are produced.
6. Most criminal acts do not become knotrn and
recorded. Studies of self-reported offenses,18 of
offenses known to public and private organizations
but not to the police, 9 of white collar crime, 20 and
of variables related to differential crime reporting2 '
make suspect any sample of presumptive nonPrelintinary Criminal Typology, 4 PAc. Soc. REv. 11

(1961); Peterson, Pittman & O'Neal, Stabilities in
Deviance: A Study of Assaultive and Non-Assaultive
Offenders, 53 J. Clm. L., C. & P.S. 44 (1962); Hayner,
Characteristicsof Five Offender Types, 26 Am. Soc. REv.
96 (1961).
27 S. & E. GLuECK, LATER CRIMINAL CAREERS
(1937); England, A Study of PostprobationRecidivism
Among Five HundredFederal Offenders, 19 Fed. Prob. 10
(Sept. 1955); Frum, Adult Criminal Offense Trends
Followving Juvenile Delinquency, 49 J. Cpmd. L., C. &
P.S. 29 (1958); Jacks, Why Are Parolees Returned to
Prison as Parole Violators? 19 Aml. J. CoRRE TiON 22
(1957).
8
1 PoRTRxiEL, op. cit. supra note 7; Wallerstein &
Wyle, supra note 7; Nye & Short, supra note 7.
11Schwartz, A Community Experiment in the M1easurement of Juvenile Delinquency, NAT'L PROBATION
AND PAoRL Ass'N YEARooc 3 (1945).
20SUTHERLAIND, WHITE COLLAR CRn
(1949);
CLINAR. op. cit. supra note 7; FuLLER, THE GENLEMEN CONSPIRATORS (1962); R. F. KENNEDY, THE
Emsnt WITHNq (1960)-a report of white collar as well

as of conventional offenses connected with the career
of Hoffa.
21 Van Vechten, Differential Criminal Case Mortality
in Selected Jurisdictions, 7 Au. Soc. Rxv. 833 (1942);
Beattie, Criminal Statistics in the United States-1960,
51 J. Cpm. L., C. & P.S. 49 (1960).

criminals randomly drawn from the non-institutionalized or "no record" population. Indeed,
Savitz's conclusion about the "non-delinquent
majority" in socially disorganized urban areas
may be generalized, it seems, to at least the
American population as a whole: "Give them
time. Most of them will be delinquent before it's
all over.lln If most criminally liable behavior is not
recorded as crime, if the relationship between
criminally liable behavior and recorded crime is not
constant, and if most of the population within a
jurisdiction do engage in such behavior more or
less frequently, then conclusions about basic
differences between the criminal and the noncriminal body, mind, personality, or subculture
are highly suspect. When statistically significant
differences are found in research comparing carefully selected recidivists and "no detectable
record" controls, conclusions may be drawn about
the attributes of persons who tend to become
involved in the ascription process resulting in
criminal status, i.e., we have clues toward an
understanding of the achievement aspects-which
may or may not be of overriding significance-of
the status ascription process. In other words, we
will know something about persons who get into
trouble, but we cannot assume either (a) that their
attributes alone explain their getting into trouble
or (b) that the relative weight of personal attributes of offenders versus characteristics of the
legal processing itself is constant.
7. Not all persons known to have violated laws
providing for penalties imposed by political authority" are subjected to punitive legal recognition.
At every stage in the law enforcement process
decisions are made regarding what aspects of
situations involving criminal acts will be emphasized. Whether or not one likes the fact, discretion
is inevitable and to some extent necessary in the
allocation of law enforcement resources. 24 If not
22

Savitz, Delinquency and Migration, in THE Soci199-205 (Wolfgang,
23 Savitz & Johnston eds. 1962).
To restrict the concept to explicit political statuses
and roles as found in contemporary large-scope societies is a matter of convenience at times, as noted by
LIZEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 31, but prohibits
fundamental research on comparative legal processes.
See HOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 50.
24 Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A
Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRI. L., C. & P.S. 780
(1956); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the AdministrationofJustice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 (1960); LaFave,
The Police and Non-Enforcement of the Law, 1962 WXis.
L. REv. 104, 179.
OLOGY Or CRnME AND DELINQUENCY
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everyone who is known to have engaged in criminally liable behavior is actually identified as a
criminal, then the more appropriate question for
criminology qua criminology seems to be not
"Why did the criminal engage in certain behavior?" but rather "Why is one person who
engages in certain behavior given the status of
criminal while another who engages in the same
behavior is not?"
8. For most offense categories the rates are relatively high for lower class, minority group, young,
male, transient, urbanpopulations. Allowing for the
differential social participation of males and of
females and for a fairly widespread cultural bias
tending to favor females with respect to legal
processing, the common attribute of the remaining
populations seems to be their vulnerability when
confronted by political authority. Only the most
sanguine can continue to assume that legal processes exist apart from the conflicts intrinsic to
social relations.25 If records of crime reveal with
great consistency that higher crime rates are
associated with relatively subordinate position
within political structures, then the assumption
that behavior variations among different categories of people are entirely, or almost always,
responsible for differences in crime rates is open
to question. Instead of assuming the criminality of
some of the characteristic behavior patterns of
persons in certain social categories and proceeding
to investigate the sources of the behavior patterns
in order presumably to explain their criminalitya neat circle-one may investigate (a) the tendency
of laws to penalize behavior characteristic of the
less powerful but not of the more powerful, and
(b) the possibility that the more powerful can use
the legal process to ascribe the status of criminal
to members of the less powerful categories of a
population irrespective of actual behavior.
WHAT HOPE FOR INTEGRATING THEORIES
OF "CRJM"

AND OF "CRInMAL

BEHAVIOR?"

P number of criminologists have attempted to
resolve the conceptual difficulties generated by the
dominant ameliorative, "offender" orientation of
the field. Statements by Sutherland, Sellin,
Tappan, Void, Jeffery, and Korn and McCorkle
are especially provocative. All of these writers
2 VorD, THEoiRticAL CRIMINOLOGY 203-19 (1958);
KiRcOHEmER, POuICAL JUSTICE (1961); Jeffery,
Criminal Justice and Social Change, in DAVIs, FoSTER,
JEFFERY & DAvIs, SocIrET ANm THE LAw 264-310

(1962).

have tried to provide a defensible scientific conception of criminology without giving up hope for
theories of criminal behavior, and all have made
signal contributions to criminological theory in the
course of failing to accomplish their objective.
Sutherland and his colleagues and students have
done criminology the great service of insisting and
demonstrating that "criminal behavior is human
behavior, ' 26 but at the same time initiated a line
of research that has now led to the conclusion that
"human behavior is human behavior" regardless
of the adjective criminal. The flaw in Sutherland's thinking does not lie in his assertion that
scientific explanation of offensive behavior will be
a specific application of a general theory of behavior, but in his assumption that the task is "to
differentiate criminal from non-criminal behavior."n This differentiation is accomplished in
the legal process, not by scientific classification.
The real task for those concerned with behavior
assumed to be offensive has been spelled out by
Sellin, who has recognized the incompatibility
between the languages and ends of law and of
behavior science.n As he says, "etiological conduct research is not greatly interested in the legal
label." 29 But even after rejecting Znaniecki's
proposal to make crime synonymous with deviant
behavior and reserving the term for "offenses made
punishable by the criminal law,"2 " he proceeds to
equate "crime" with "behavior" and "crime
causation" with "conduct research."' It appears
that at this point Sellin did not keep in mind the
distinction, which he earlier recognized, between
the procedures and aims of legal classification and
of scientific behavior classification.
As the behavior scientists have rightly struggled
to avoid letting legislators and other non-scientists
define their basic terms of inquiry, so have the
legal scholars, notably Paul Tappan, never relented in their just refusal to allow the behavior
scientists to play fast and loose with the legal
process as they sought a workable definition of
criminal behavior.
"Our definitions of crime cannot be rooted in
epithets, in minority value judgments or prejudice, or in loose abstractions."n
26

SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRMi-

75 (5th ed. 1955).
7 bid.
2 SFrn=, CUL-TR
CoNLICr AND CRur 24 (1938).
20 Id. at 44.
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2

3 Id. at 32.
M
32Id. at 44-45.
TAPPAN,

(1960).
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"In the developed society... criminal law and
its correctional instruments become the ultimate
regulators, though their effectiveness, like that
of the mores, is circumscribed by public opinion
and by the community reaction to constituted
authority and to those who offend."-"
Nonetheless, it is still the offender's behavior
which is of central concern to Tappan;a to him
the most fundamental problem for criminologists
is "that of determining the specific connotations
of the criminal universe." 35 Tappan's questions
are "Who is the criminal, how large a social
problem is he, and how can we best manipulate
and control him?" Effective legal control mechanisms do require understanding of the etiology of
human behavior, but to define criminal behavior
as "in fact what the state through its legislature
and courts says it is ' ' 36is not only to impose nonscientific definitions on the basic terms of behavior
research but also to reify the state without getting
at the distinctively criminological problem: to
explain the criminality.
Vold's interpretation of the behaviorist-versuslegalist dilemma is that there is "always a dual
problem of explanation-that of accounting for
the behavior, as behavior, and equally important,
accounting for the definitions by which specific
behavior comes to be considered as crime or noncrime." 7 The dual problem does not exist, however, unless the investigator continues to assume
that he must not only seek to explain criminality,
the definitions, but offensive behavior as well and
using the same basic concepts of crime and criminal.
Vold, perhaps more than any other single criminologist, has stressed the importance of the study of
crime "as an aspect of the collision of and struggle
for dominance among the groups and organizations
of power in the community."3n Yet, he hesitates
to abandon the search for theories that will "serve
to explain many kinds of impulsive, irrational acts
of a criminalnature that are quite unrelated to any
battle between different interest groups in organized society." 9
Jeffery has reasserted the need for a sociology of
criminal law that seeks to determine the conditions under which behavior is defined as criminal
and to delineate the relationships between legal
.Id. at 178.
aId. at 10.
15Id. at 3.
38Id. at 7.
317VoLn, op. cit. supra note 25, at vi.
id. at 13.
Id. at 219. My italics.

and other norms. 4 He emphasizes that "criminality
exists not in the behavior but in the social system
that controls and regulates the behavior"'" and
that "if you want to know something about crime
you need to study social systems, not criminals."n2
In reference to socialization-acculturation theories
of criminal behavior, specifically Sutherland's
differential association,Jeffery has pointed out the
inability of such theories to explain the origins of
crime rates, correctly noting that they actually
"explain how a person comes into contact with
criminality if and when criminality is a part of his
cultural system."' Unfortunately, Jeffery also has
fallen into the trap of assuming that one must try
to integrate the reformist and the scientific conceptions of criminology. It turns out that "the
class 'criminal' is a class of objects included within
a larger class 'social isolates' ", that "criminality is
one of several ways in which a person can adjust
to social impersonalization.""4 If one assumes that
"law-violators" are necessarily a subcategory of
"norm-violators"' 45 whose "criminal behavior is an
attempt to establish interpersonal relationships
that have not been established in a socially acceptable way," 46 then he is assuming that legally
classified individuals are a subclass of a scientifically determined class of deviants-which is a
restatement of Tappan's "legalistic behaviorism."
While Jeffery has called for and contributed to
work on basic criminological problems, he has
vitiated his contribution by an empirically dubious
attempted integration of "a legal theory of crime"
with a psychologistic theory of "criminal" behavior.
Korn and McCorkle have come close to reconciling science and reformism in criminological
theory.a Recognizing the critical significance of the
legal process, they define a criminal as an individual
"adjudged to be punishable by the authorities -3
and crime as "an act or omission ascribed to a
person when he is punished by the authorities." 9
4ojeffery, The Structure of American Criminological
Thinking, 46J . CM.m L., C. & P.S. 658 (1956); Crime,
Law
and Social Structure,47 id. at 423.
4
lJeffery, The Structure of American Criminological
Thinking,
supra note 40, at 669.
42
Id. at 671.
4Jeffery, An Integrated Theory of Crime and Criminal Behavior 49 J. CrM. L., C. & P.S. 533, 537-39
(1959).
" Id. at 539.
45 Id. at 552.
46 Id. at 539.
7 KoRN & McCoRE, op. cit. supra note 10, at
303-53.
48 Id. at 45.
49Id. at 46.
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They emphasize the point that the criminality of
any act and the criminal status of any actor are
determined through socio-legal procedures and
"can only be conjectured about in advance."O
Difficulties appear, however, when they try to
integrate the socio-legal view of criminality with a
social psychological theory of behavior. The main
contribution of these writers is to indicate how role
theory can be applied to understanding and
changing the behavior of those who do commit
criminal acts. Behavior, including criminal acts,
tends to become patterned through a process in
which the individual learns and is committed to
behavior expected of him by others, both those
who approve and those who disapprove. 5 Exploratory behavior that amounts to no more than
a "tentative trying-on of roles ' ' 2 tends to be taken
very seriously if it results in personal or property
damage or loss. The reactions of authorities and
the public may help to reinforce the learning of
disapproved patterns and to close off legitimate
alternatives.n In this way, "criminal roles" are
acquired. But to explain the acquisition of roles
is, once more, not to explain the criminality of the
behavior. In fact, the concept role itself may tend
to exaggerate the degree to which most acts
ascribed to offenders express systematic participation in networks of law-abiding and law-breaking
relationships.M In any event, it seems highly
probable that for those concerned with rehabilitation there inevitably will be "almost as many
separate accounts as there are individual crimes or
55
criminals."
CONCLUSIONS

In considering implications of the foregoing for
criminology, the writer is very much aware of two
problems: (1) that he may appear to be indulging
in a sweeping iconoclasm that denies the worth of
"applied" interests in crime control, and (2) that
he may be accused of attempting to dictate what is
and what is not properly to be called criminology.
To those who view criminology as primarily an
eclectic and applied discipline, it may seem that
the writer feels that research into the social and
psychological characteristics of offenders should
50
Id. at 47.
51
52 Id. at 334-49.
Id. at 349.
5 Ibid.
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Korn and McCorkle are aware of the problem of
varying degrees of "intensive" and "extensive" commitment. Id. at 341-43.
Id.at 325.
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cease. Such an interpretation would be in error,
since the conception of criminology as a scientific
discipline with its own analytically distinct
problems by no means precludes an interest in
changing behavior on the basis of certain value
assumptions.56 The point of the argument is that
the differences between the reformist and the
analytical interests, and the research problems of
each, are fundamental and should be made explicit. It has been, is, and will continue to be
misleading and confusing for social psychologists,
legal scholars, corrections personnel, and others to
assume or seem to assume that they can produce
and use theories of criminal behavior. It is reluctance on the part of criminologists and non-criminologists alike to abandon the fruitless and unnecessary effort to reconcile reformism with the
"scientific" view of criminology that perpetuates
the confusion that is purportedly the science of
crime.n Clarity, at least, will be gained if (a) those
who assume criminality and support certain values
and (b) those who study the ways in which values
determine the application of the adjective criminal
will unabashedly state precisely which category
applies, and when, to them and their work.
As for the notion that this writer is interested
in dictating the proper use of the word "criminology," it is not consensus on semantics but the
explicit and consistent realization of the difference
between two kinds of interests, both of which

happen to be associated with the word "crime,"
that is the objective. If the primary aim of
"criminological" research per se is not to develop
theories of criminal behavior-if, indeed, any
attempt to do so is doomed to failure-it follows
that the traditional image of criminology as the
scientific discipline that seeks to do just that is
not an image which can be accepted by those who
are interested in the distinctive problems of explaining criminality.is Similarly, those scientists
56The foray of Jerome Michael and Mortimer Adler
is 30 years in the past; not sweeping iconoclasm but a
sharpening of conceptual and methodological tools is
needed today. MicHAEL & ADLER, Cius, LAW AMD
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1933).
5 One eminent scholar recently concluded an excursion through Europe and the United States by declaring that "in the present state of knowledge, the very
attempt to elucidate the causes of crime would be better
put aside." RAnziNowicz, IN SEARCH O CRIMINOLOGY
175 (1961).
5 There appear to be four kinds of distinctively
"criminological" problems. To deal with any of them
requires an understanding of the pervasiveness of social
conflict in human affairs and implies an effort to relate
the general phenomena of conflict to some major aspect
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and non-scientists who accept the assumptions of a
particular socio-legal structure and wish to apply
their skills and experience to the problems of (1)
reducing the incentives and opportunities for
persons to engage in disapproved activities and
(2) apprehending offenders and changing their
behavior in desired directions are encouraged to
make their values more explicit and to be more
aware of differences between the roles of the reformer and of the scientist concerned with explaining 'qegal norms" without necessarily conof the legal process that defines right and wrong and
determines the criminal or non-criminal status of the
actors within a given jurisdiction. The sets of problems
are (1) to determine the conditions under which the
very concept of law, of the rule of law, appears, varies,
and declines; (2) to explain the enactment and wording
of statutory law, i.e., the legislative aspect of the legal
process; (3) to explain variations in interpretations of
statutes; and (4) to specify relations among statutory
law (involving the notion of "legislative intent"), court
or "case" law, policeman's law, and "folk law" as these
determine de facto criminality-which implies study
of relations between (a) the actual behavior of persons
and (b) the legal process, to determine the contributions
of each class of variables to the probabilities of identification as criminal.

cerning himself with explaining the behavior of
those who are defined as having violated some
specific "legal norms" in some particular time and
jurisdiction. The roles are equally important59 and
may to some extent be performed by the same
individual, but he must remain aware of the activities and terminologies appropriate to each if
he is to perform either effectively. Failure to keep
the roles distinct has resulted in a conceptual
morass that has both stunted the growth of a
science of crime as such and hindered the effective
application of sociological, psychological, and
biological knowledge to problems of control and
reform.
The gross imbalance between the personnel and
other resources directly and indirectly allocated to
reformism and the resources available for research on
the problems noted in footnote 58 must be reduced if
theories explaining criminality are to be produced.
Increasing interest in studies of various aspects of the
legal process and in non-Western legal structures and
concepts of law is a favorable sign, but practical efforts
to revise curricula and the traditional "criminology"
textbook and to channel research funds into projects of
more significance for the study of crime but less relevance for the prevention and change of certain behavior
have scarcely begun.

